Abstract. In this paper, we study the security of the Encrypt-MaskDecrypt mode of operation, also called EMD, which was recently proposed for applications such as disk-sector encryption. The EMD mode transforms an ordinary block cipher operating on n-bit blocks into a tweakable block cipher operating on large blocks of size nm bits. We first show that EMD is not a secure tweakable block cipher and then describe efficient attacks in the context of disk-sector encryption. We note that the parallelizable variant of EMD, called EME that was proposed at the same time is also subject to these attacks. In the course of developing one of the attacks, we revisit Wagner's generalized birthday algorithm and show that in some special cases it performs much more efficiently than in the general case. Due to the large scope of applicability of this algorithm, even when restricted to these special cases, we believe that this result is of independent interest.
Introduction
Very recently, Rogaway proposed in [5] two new modes of operation that are specifically tailored for applications such as disk-sector encryption. The first mode called EMD (Encrypt-Mask-Decrypt) mostly consists in two consecutive passes of CBC encryption/decryption. Thus it is a sequential mode. The second mode called EME is a parallelizable version of EMD. In an updated version of [5] , written with Halevi, the EMD algorithm is presented under the new name CMC. In particular, during the First IEEE International Security in Storage Workshop, held Dec. 11th, 2002 in Greenbelt, Maryland, the algorithm was presented under this new name.
In order to encrypt disk-sectors, several important properties are often required. First, when encrypting a single sector, a change in any single plaintext bit should impact the complete ciphertext sector. Since disk sectors are much larger than the block-size of usual block ciphers and since ordinary modes of operation such a CBC encryption do not ensure this property, this requirement calls for a specific construction. Second, for efficiency reasons, each sector should be encrypted independently of other sectors. As a consequence, an electronic code book at the sector level is expected. However, to avoid attacks based on sectors switching, it is highly desirable to use a (slightly) different encryption for each sector. This idea can be rigorously realized by using the notion of tweakable block ciphers which was recently proposed by Liskov, Rivest and Wagner in [4] . Informally, a tweakable block cipher is a block cipher which possesses an extra input called the tweak. It should resist distinguishing attacks mounted by powerful adversaries which are allowed access to encryption and decryption oracles and can choose both the plaintext or ciphertext messages and the tweak parameters.
In order to meet these specifications, Rogaway proposed the modes of operation EMD and EME in order to build a tweakable block cipher with a large blocksize of nm bits from an ordinary block cipher with a blocksize of n bits. In these constructions, m represents the number of blocks that can be fitted into a single disk sector. In [5] , he also stated a security theorem for the EMD mode
In this paper, we show that neither the EMD nor the EME modes of operation are secure tweakable block cipher. We proceed in several steps, first in section 2 we briefly recall the constructions from [5] , then in section 3 we describe distinguishing attacks against the two modes, finally in section 4 we show practical attacks in the context of disk-sector encryption. In one of the practical attacks we make use of Wagner's algorithm for solving the generalized birthday problem, which he introduced at Crypto'2002 in [6] . In order to improve the attack, we need to use the algorithm in a special case which was not considered by Wagner. It turns out that in this special case, the algorithm still works and moreover it becomes much more efficient than in the general case. An heuristic analysis of Wagner's algorithm restricted to these special cases is given in appendix.
Description of EMD and EME
In this section, we give brief descriptions of the EMD and EME modes of operation as proposed in [5] . We only describe the forward direction (encryption). For complete specifications, the reader should refer to the original paper [5] .
The EMD mode
The EMD (Encrypt-Mask-Decrypt) mode of operation is based on CBC encryption. In order to simplify the description of this mode, we use two subroutines CBCEncrypt and CBCDecrypt that respectively perform CBC encryption and CBC decryption. These routines take as input a keyed block cipher E K and a m-uple of input blocks X 1 , . . . , X m and output a m-uple Y 1 , Y 2 , . . . , Y m . There is a simple but important difference between ordinary CBC decryption and the CBC decryption as used in EMD. More precisely, in the latter case, individual blocks are encrypted (by the block cipher E K ) instead of being decrypted (by its inverse E −1 K ). The two routines CBCEncrypt and CBCDecrypt are respectively described in tables 1 and 2. Note that the mask computation makes use of a function multx which represents multiplication by x in the finite field F 2 n . Furthermore, in order to perform decryption, it should be noted that the mask value can also be computed as a function of CCC 1 and CCC m . Indeed, CCC 1 ⊕ CCC m is always equal to P P P 1 ⊕ P P P m . 
The EME mode
The EME mode is a parallelizable variant of EMD, it makes use of various techniques that were introduced for parallelizable modes of operations in papers such as [3, 2, 1] . In order to simplify the description of this mode, we introduce two subroutines ParaEncrypt and ParaDecrypt. These routines take as input a keyed block cipher E K and a m-uple of input blocks X 1 , . . . , X m and output a m-uple Y 1 , Y 2 , . . . , Y m . They are described in tables 4 and 5. In the two subroutines, the notation iL represents the multiplication in F 2 n of the element L by the element having the same binary representation as the integer i.
Given these two subroutines, the description of the EME works as follow. Starting for a plaintext sector P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P m , first apply ParaEncrypt, then perform the exclusive-or of the intermediate values with a mask which is computed as a function of the tweak parameter T and the exclusive-or of all intermediate blocks. Afterward, apply ParaDecrypt and obtain the ciphertext. This is summarized in table 6. In this table, the equation CCC ← P P P ⊕ M ask is a shorthand notation that means that the exclusive-or with the mask value is performed, in parallel, on each block of P P P .
Distinguishers against EMD and EME
In order to show that the EMD and EME are not secure as tweakable block ciphers, we propose simple attacks that distinguish these constructions from random tweakable permutations. These distinguishing attacks are extremely efficient, since they require only 3 calls to the encryption/decryption oracle and succeed with overwhelming probability. Table 6 . The EME mode of operation
We briefly recall the usual framework for distinguishing attacks. Assume that we are given access to a black-box oracle that contains either an implementation of EMD (or EME) or a truly random tweakable permutation (i.e., a family of truly random permutations indexed by the tweak value). We are allowed to perform both encryption and decryption queries with the oracle and we fully control the plaintext/ciphertext values and the tweak values in these queries.
After some queries, we should guess whether the black-box is an implementation of EMD (resp. EME) or a truly random tweakable permutation. We are considered successful if our probability of producing a correct guess is significatively better than 1/2.
The case of EMD
In order to attack EMD we proceed as follows. First, choose a random plaintext
m ), a random tweak value T and obtain the correspond-
m ). Then, ask for the decryption of the ciphertext C
(1) with tweak T ⊕ 1. Denote by P (2) the corresponding plaintext. Finally, form the plaintext P (3) as follows:
Then we ask for the encryption C (3) of P (3) with tweak T and check whether the following conditions hold.
-Check that C
If the conditions hold, we guess that the black-box oracle contains an implementation of EMD, otherwise, we guess that it is a truly random tweakable permutation. Clearly, with a truly random tweakable permutation, the conditions hold with negligible probability 2 −(m−1)n . However, with an implementation of EMD it is easy to check that they always hold. In order to verify this claim, assume that the intermediate values P P P and CCC in the above computations are respectively denoted by P P P (1) , CCC (1) , P P P (2) , CCC (2) and P P P (3) , CCC (3) . Then, remark that CCC (2) = CCC (1) , and furthermore that P P P (2) = P P P
(1) ⊕ 1, where the exclusive-or is performed on every block in P P P (1) . For the third call to EMD, we have P P P (3) 1
1 , and
We can also check that for all i from 4 to m, we have P P P
As a consequence, CCC (3) and CCC (1) are equal on all blocks except one. The single block that differs is block number m − 1, which satisfy the relation CCC immediately follows. As a consequence, the attacker we just proposed always outputs the correct answer when the black box contains an implementation of EMD. Moreover, when the black box contains a truly random tweakable permutation the answer is correct with probability 1 − 2 −(m−1)n . Thus the attacker succeeds with overwhelming probability and the EMD mode of operation does not realize a secure tweakable block cipher.
The case of EME
With EME, a variant of the above attack can be derived. As before, choose a random plaintext P (1)
m , a random tweak value T and obtain the corresponding ciphertext C
m . Then, ask for the decryption of the ciphertext C
(1) with tweak T ⊕ 1. Denote by P
1 , P
2 , . . . , P
m the corresponding plaintext. Form the plaintext P (3) as follows:
Then, ask for the encryption C (3) of P (3) with tweak T and check whether the following conditions hold.
-No condition to check on C
It is easy to verify that the mask values in the first and third encryption are equal. As a consequence, the above conditions always hold. Therefore, as for EMD, we obtain an efficient attacker that distinguishes between the EME mode and a truly random tweakable permutation.
Practical attacks in the disk-sector encryption context
In this section, we revisit the attacks on EMD and EME to turn them into practical attacks that can decrypt any ciphertext present on a disk sector. We study the security of the modes in the context of disk-sector encryption for multiuser operating system. We assume that the disk encryption key is fixed, known to the operating system but protected from malicious users. We also assume that malicious users can read and write any ciphertext sectors at the hardware level. However, the operating system ensures that users can read or write plaintext sectors only when the sector is part of a file which belongs to the user. Note that the operating system cannot prevent a malicious user to access the disk at hardware level in all cases. Indeed, with physical access to the machine, it is possible to reboot using a different system or even to remove the hard disk from the computer and access it with separate harware. We consider two different kinds of implementations. In basic implementations, we assume that the tweak value of a sector is the sector number. Moreover, we assume that a malicious user can choose the numbers of the sectors that are allocated to his files. In cautious implementations, we assume that the tweak values are obtained by hashing the sector numbers to full-size tweaks and that no user can choose his sectors. As a consequence, the tweak values are known but cannot be controled by malicious users.
In the system, at least two users are present, the target of the attack Alice and the attacker Eve. Alice has written sensitive information, say P 1 , . . . , P m , in a disk sector with tweak value T . Eve has obtained the associated ciphertext C 1 , . . . , C m by accessing the disk hardware. Her goal is by playing around with other sectors which she legitimately accesses to fool the operating system and force it to reveal P .
Attack of basic implementations
With basic implementations, Eve chooses two convenient values δ 1 and δ 2 . She asks the operating system to give her ownership of the three sectors numbered T ⊕ δ 1 , T ⊕ δ 2 and T ⊕ δ 1 ⊕ δ 2 . If the operating system cannot comply, she simply chooses different values of δ 1 and δ 2 and she restarts.
Once Eve holds the three sectors, she copies Alice's ciphertext C in sector T ⊕ δ 1 and reads some plaintext P (1) in the sector. Then she writes P (1) in sector T ⊕ δ 2 and recovers some ciphertext C (2) . Finally, she moves C (2) in sector T ⊕ δ 1 ⊕ δ 2 and reads a plaintext P (3) . We claim that P (3) is in fact Alice's plaintext P .
In order to prove our claim, we denote by P P P , CCC, P P P (1) , CCC (1) , P P P (2) , CCC (2) , P P P (3) and CCC (3) the intermediate values in the encryption/decryption calls. Then we check that the following relations hold:
CCC
(1) = CCC, 2. P P P
(1) = P P P ⊕ δ 1 ,
The final equality implies that P (3) = P and concludes the proof of the claim. As a consequence, Eve has attained her goal and obtained the decryption of Alice's sensitive information. We note that the very same attack also applies to the parallelizable mode EME.
Attack of cautious implementations
With cautious implementations, Eve can no longer obtain ownership of sectors whose tweaks satisfy the correct relation. As a consequence, the attack becomes harder. However, by creating files with many disk-sectors, Eve can obtain a large set T of random looking tweaks. If she could find a subset (of odd size) T 1 , T 2 , . . . T 2k+1 of elements in T satisfying the relation:
she could apply a generalization of the attack presented in subsection 4.1. Indeed, when decrypting a ciphertext with tweak value T 2i+1 and re-encrypting with tweak value T 2i+2 , we simply offset the intermediate value by an exclusive-or with T 2i+1 ⊕ T 2i+2 . Thus, by alternatively decrypting and encrypting with T 1 , T 2 , . . . , T 2k , we offset the original value of CCC by T 1 ⊕T 2 ⊕· · · T 2k = T ⊕T 2k+1 . As a consequence, the final decryption with tweak T 2k+1 reveals Alice's plaintext.
In order to evaluate the efficiency of the proposed attack, we need to explain how to find a good subset in T . Of course, as soon as T has more that n + 1 elements (where n is the tweak size in bits), we expect to find a solution with high probability. Indeed, in a set T with n + 1 elements, there are 2 n+1 possible subsets among which 2 n have odd size. Since T is a n-bit value, we expect that the exclusive-or of at least one of the subsets of odd size will be equal to T , with constant probability 1 . However, to compute such a subset, simple algorithms such as exhaustive search (with runtime 2 n ) or basic time-memory tradeoffs (with runtime 2 n/2 ) are too slow to be effective in our case. Indeed, if the adversary is able to perform computation of the order of 2 n (or even 2 n/2 ), he can try exhaustive search attacks against the key of the elementary block cipher.
Yet, at Crypto'2002, Wagner presented in [6] an efficient algorithm that addresses this problem. Given 2 t independent lists of elements, L 1 , L 2 , . . . , L 2 t , his algorithm outputs 2 t elements x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x 2 t (one from each list) such that:
This algorithm runs in time O(2 t · 2 n/(1+t) ) and requires lists of size O(2 n/(1+t) ). Wagner's algorithm can be fitted to our need, by first choosing one arbitrary element T in T , then by constructing the lists in the following way. Divide the rest of T in 2 t lists of equal length, L 1 , L 2 , . . . , L 2 t . Then, modify one of the lists by xoring it with T ⊕ T . Clearly, any solution given by the algorithm of Wagner can be translated into a equation of the form:
which can be used by Eve to perform our attack.
The next question is to determine the optimal value of t and see how efficient is the attack derive from this algorithm. A similar problem was already addressed by Wagner in [6] in order to attack the blind signature scheme of Schnorr. The optimal choice is t = √ n which leads to a sub-exponential attack with a running time O(2 2 √ n ). With a typical block cipher size, i.e. n = 128 the optimal choice is t = 11 and it leads to a very practical attack, where Eve needs to allocate about 2 22 sectors 2 and to perform a computation of the order of 2 22 operations. As a result, Eve obtains a relation with 2048 terms and can recover Alice's plaintext after 2049 encryption/decryption steps.
In fact, by slightly modifying Wagner's algorithm, it is possible to obtain much better performance. The modification is straightforward, however, in order to verify that it works, it should be analyzed carefully. We perform this analysis in appendix. The idea of the modification, is to considerer lists L 1 , L 2 , . . . , L 2 t which are no longer independent. In that case, we can still apply the algorithm of Wagner and hope that it will work. Of course, since the lists are no longer independent, we need fewer elements, moreover, by removing multiple copies of some computations, we greatly speed up the algorithm. In fact, if some care is taken, this really works and we obtain an even better version of Wagner's algorithm. Details are given in the appendix, and for the sake of simplicity, we only give the raw results in the present section.
Once the independence condition is removed, we can build the lists as follows. The first list L 1 is simply T minus the element T , all lists from L 2 to L 2 t −1 are copies of L 1 . Finally, the last list L 2 t is a copy of L 1 where each element is Table 7 . Possible trade-offs for n = 128 with dependent lists.
xored with T ⊕ T . As before, any solution can be translated into a equation of the form:
and can be used by Eve to perform the attack. Due to the improved performance, several different tradeoffs are now possible. To choose between these tradeoffs, Eve needs to take into account two parameters, the size of the temporary files she can create to mount the attack and the number of encryption/decryption she can perform. Note, that in certain contexts, reading and writing the encrypted disks sector can be easily done in software, while in other contexts low-level access to the hardware need to be performed. In the second case, Eve might want to limit the number of accesses. At one extreme, Eve can choose t = 11, create lists of 4096 sectors 3 and perform at most 2049 encryption/decryption steps. At the other, Eve can choose t = 5, create lists of 8 388 608 sectors 4 and perform at most 33 encryption/decryption steps. We have implemented the algorithm, set ourselves a typical challenge (which is precisely described in the appendix) and run the algorithm for all values of t in the range from 5 to 11. The tradeoffs we used, the number of solutions found and the runtimes on a 1.5Ghz Pentium 4 are presented in table 7. One particular solution for t = 5 in given in table 8 at the end of the appendix. Since the runtimes range from a few seconds to a few minutes, we conclude that even careful implementations of disk-sector encryption using the EMD (or EME) mode of operation are utterly insecure.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that the modes of operation EMD and EME proposed by Rogaway in [5] for application such as disk-sector encryption are not secure. A question of practical interest is to correct these modes of operations or to find secure alternatives. Indeed, there is a real need for tweakable block ciphers with large blocksize in practical applications.
As a side bonus, we remarked that Wagner's algorithm as described in [6] can also be applied to lists which are not independent. This special case of the algorithm could be used for many application and when applicable, it performs even better that the general case. 
A Revisiting Wagner's generalized birthday algorithm
At Crypto'2002, Wagner presented in [6] a generalized birthday problem which occurs in many subfields of cryptography. This problem is, given 2 t lists of nbits numbers L 1 , L 2 , . . . , L 2 t to find x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x 2 t , each drawn from the corresponding list such that:
Wagner also proposed an algorithm to solve this problem, together with some variants where the ⊕ operation is replaced by addition modulo 2 n or modulo q. However, he only considered the case where the lists L i are built independently at random. We claim that his algorithm still works when the lists L 1 up to L 2 t are all copies of a small number of basic lists, or even when all the lists are identical.
A.1 Overview of Wagner's algorithm
The main idea of Wagner's algorithm is to search for solutions that satisfy extra conditions. Of course, this means that many solutions of the initial problem are lost, but on the other hand, the remaining ones can be found quickly. This is done by dividing n into t + 1 slices each containing (approximately) the same number of bits. Then, the algorithm follows a tree of successive reductions. At the first level of the tree, lists L 2k and L 2k+1 are joined into a new list L (1) k that contains all numbers of the form x 2k ⊕ x 2k+1 which evaluate to zero on the first slice of bits. This basic operation is called a join operation and denoted by in [6] . When we want to specify the slice of bits on which the join operation is performed, we add a subscript. With this notation, the first level consists in operations of the form:
Similarly, the i-th level of Wagner's algorithm consists in operations of the form:
. At the last level (level number t) the join operation is formed simultaneously of the two slices of bits numbered t and t + 1. By abuse of notation, we will denote this last join operation by t , thus implicitely expanding slice number t to include slice number t + 1.
Clearly, since all lists in the same level are mutually independent, when the numbers of bits in each slice are equal to the logarithm (in base 2) of the size of the initial lists, all join operations except the last one roughly preserve the sizes of the lists. Moreover, the last join operation outputs a small list of final solutions.
At explained in [6] , the join operation can be very efficiently performed by sorting the two lists and by reading the partial collisions from the sorted lists.
A.3 The case of two lists
When all the lists are either L or L , Wagner's algorithm is also very fast. In the general case, with an arbitrary repartition between copies of L, 3 join paths of length t are required. For the sake of simplicity, we only address two of these cases, where the repartition is either 2 t−1 copies of L and 2 t−1 copies of L or 2 t − 1 copies of L and a single copy of L . In these two cases, 2 join paths will suffice.
The first repartition is the simplest to deal with, it suffices to apply the join tree for 2 t−1 copies of a single list twice, on L and on L independently and finally to join the two resulting lists at the last level.
With the second repartition, let L (0) = L and L (0) = L , then at each level but the last, we perform two join operations as follow:
At the last level, we terminate by computing the join of L (t−1) and L (t−1) . Of course, this fast evaluation of Wagner's trees can be generalized to any small number m of different lists. Then, the maximal number of join paths is bounded by 2m − 1. Thus, in all these cases, we get a complexity of O(t · 2 t ) elementary operations instead of O(2 2t ) for the original algorithm.
A.4 Implementation, Practical challenge
In order to verify that our rough heuristic analysis is indeed correct, we implemented the algorithm and we did set up a practical challenge for ourselves. This challenge is in the spirit of cautious implementations of disk-sector encryption as described in section 4.2. We arbitrarily decided that the tweak values for sector number i would be generated by truncating to 128 bits the result of SHA-1 applied on the character string containing the decimal representation of i. Moreover, we decided to choose to special values of i for the tweak values T and T associated to Alice's sector and to the final decryption in the attack from section 4.2. Namely, for T we choose i = −1 and for T we choose i = 0. The rest of the values range from 1 to the total number of needed sectors. We computed this total number for various values of the parameter t (see table 7 ) and ran the algorithm. For t = 5, the solutions we found (in 8 minutes) are compact enough to include in this paper, one of them is given in table 8. The hash values in the table are written in hexadecimal.
Note: In the implementation, we took care to remove any non-trivial duplicates appearing during the computation. While very few such duplicates do appear, this step is important. Indeed, non-trivial duplicates lead to trivial solutions at the next level. Moreover, a small number of trivial solutions quickly undergoes an exponential growth, fill the available memory and cause the algorithm to fail.
